We consider the procedure for small-sample estimation of reliability parameters. The main shortcomings of the classical methods and the Bayesian approach are analyzed. Models that find robust Bayesian estimates are proposed. The sensitivity of the Bayesian estimates to the choice of the prior distribution functions is investigated using models that find upper and lower bounds. The proposed models reduce to optimization problems in the space of distribution functions.

Монография предназначена для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей юридических и философских факультетов, а также для всех тех, кто интересуется философско-правовой проблематикой.

P S Wilson; Interests, Values and Educational Language, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–166, https://doi.org/10.1.

P S Wilson; Perspectives on Punishment—Reply to Pamela Moore, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 103–134, https://doi.org.

P S Wilson; Child-Centred Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–126, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1969.

P S Wilson; Interests and Educational Values, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 181–199, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

IN the final section of his chapter on ‘Perception’ in The Problem of Knowledge, Ayer makes the statement that ‘The failure of phenomenalism does not mean, however, that there is no logical connection of any kind between the way physical objects appear to us and the way they really are’. To prove his contention, he sets out ‘a pair of limiting cases’ of conditions in which the truth of premises referring exclusively to ‘appearance’ would allegedly afford logical guarantees for the (...) existence, or the non-existence, of physical objects. In this paper I wish to raise some serious reservations concerning the viability of the second of these two limiting conditions, which reads. (shrink)

IT has been some time now since anyone professing himself to be a phenomenalist has characterized physical objects as ‘logical constructions out of sense-data’ in the strict sense of this expression. If he is to be justified in applying the expression in the strict sense, the phenomenalist must demonstrate that there exists a relation of mutual entailment between a statement implying the existence of a physical object and a statement referring exclusively to our ‘sense-experiences’. As a matter of historical fact, (...) no phenomenalist has ever succeeded in doing this; and it is now generally acknowledged, even by those who still wish to adhere to some form of a phenomenalistic analysis of physical object statements, that there are difficulties in principle why the reductivist programme of the early phenomenalists cannot be carried out. The modern-day phenomenalist, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls in his predecessors’ position, tends to regard physical objects as fruitful and convenient theoretical constructions for interpreting and predicting our sense-experiences. Thus, although still committed to the view that physical objects are ‘constructed’ out of sense-data, he is no longer committed to the thesis of a strict logical equivalence between statements about objects and statements about experiences. Professor A J Ayer, perhaps the foremost exponent of this type of view today, put the matter this way not so long ago. (shrink)

Chapter Promising in Law and Morals Promissory and contractual obligations raise many issues of common interest to philosophers and lawyers. ...

In their article, Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) outline the conditions that they have identified as situations in which it is ethically permissible to use chemical restraints, defined as medicati...